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A B S T R A C T
Much academic research on low-carbon transitions focuses on the diffusion or use of innovations such as electric
vehicles or solar panels, but overlooks or obscures downstream and upstream processes, such as mining or waste
flows. Yet it is at these two extremes where emerging low-carbon transitions in mobility and electricity are
effectively implicated in toxic pollution, biodiversity loss, exacerbation of gender inequality, exploitation of
child labor, and the subjugation of ethnic minorities. We conceptualize these processes as part of an emerging
“decarbonisation divide.” To illustrate this divide with clear insights for political ecology, sustainability tran-
sitions, and energy justice research, this study draws from extensive fieldwork examining cobalt mining in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the processing and recycling of electronic waste in Ghana. It
utilizes original data from 34 semi-structured research interviews with experts and 69 community interviews
with artisanal cobalt miners, e-waste scrapyard workers, and other stakeholders, as well as 50 site visits. These
visits included 30 industrial and artisanal cobalt mines in the DRC, as well as associated infrastructure such as
trading depots and processing centers, and 20 visits to the Agbogbloshie scrapyard and neighborhood alongside
local waste collection sites, electrical repair shops, recycling centers, and community e-waste dumps in Ghana.
The study proposes a concerted set of policy recommendations for how to better address issues of exploitation
and toxicity, suggestions that go beyond the often-touted solutions of formalisation or financing. Ultimately, the
study holds that we must all, as researchers, planners, and citizens, broaden the criteria and analytical para-
meters we use to evaluate the sustainability of low-carbon transitions.
1. Introduction
The window of opportunity for mitigating climate change is closing.
Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C will require reaching 80% zero-
emission energy by 2030 and 100% by 2050 (IPCC 2018). Cumulative
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions must at least be reduced by a further
470 gigatons (Gt) by 2050 compared to “business as usual” practices.
Such climate policy imperatives have sparked a veritable shift to
lower-carbon innovations, technologies, and pathways—a process
known as decarbonisation—across a variety of domains. According to
recent scenarios, decarbonisation would imply a rapid ramping up of
several low-carbon systems and associated technologies. The
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA, 2018) reports in their
most recent outlook that between 2015 and 2050, the share of low-
carbon electricity in total final energy consumption needs to double as
technologies such as electric vehicles (EV), battery storage, heat pumps,
and solar PV become mainstream.
Underlying these much-heralded trends, however, is concomitant
growth in the demand for critical materials, minerals, and metals. The
International Resource Panel (2019) recently noted that resource ex-
traction has more than tripled since 1970, underwriting a fivefold in-
crease in the use of non-metallic minerals; and that by 2060, global
material use could double to 190 billion tons.
One of the other key consequences of the expansion in low carbon
technology is the significant growth in flows of electronic waste (e-
waste), a toxic and persistent waste stream which includes discarded
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wind turbine components, electric vehicle batteries, solar panels, smart
meters, heat pumps, and a variety of other devices and products (Baldé
et al., 2017). Each year some 44.7 million metric tons of e-waste are
generated, an amount equivalent to about 4500 Eiffel Towers (Baldé
et al., 2017). The amount of e-waste is rising by about 8 million tons
annually, adding to a total global inventory of about 50 million tons; of
this waste, only approximately 20 percent is recycled (Daum 2017).
Within these waste flows are various components and materials with
significant health and environmental harms including brominated
flame-retardants, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and toxic metals
including lead, copper, mercury, and cadmium
(Amankwaa et al. 2017). There is an unevenness and environmental
health calamity in the production and consumption of e-waste: the
main producers are Europe and the United States, but the main re-
ceivers or importers are in Africa and Asia (Sthiannopkao and Wong
2013).
In this study, we argue that such unevenness extends not only to the
backend of low-carbon technologies (e-waste) but also its frontend
(mining and materials), and we term this disparity the “decarbonisation
divide.” We explore the extent to which the diffusion of technology
behind global low-carbon transitions negatively impacts communities
at opposite ends of the supply chain: upstream, at sites of extraction of
critical materials such as cobalt and copper; and downstream, at
scrapyards and facilities handling their waste streams. The aims and
objectives of the study are threefold: to document and humanize how
communities cope with the negative impacts of decarbonisation, to
reveal tensions and tradeoffs between global climate policy and local
justice concerns, and to steer more informed local, national, and global
sustainability action.
Drawn from extensive original field research in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Ghana, we ask: How are the tech-
nologies used in low-carbon transitions linked to negative impacts in
upstream and downstream parts of their lifecycle? Relatedly, what
vulnerabilities can low-carbon transitions exacerbate in such mining
and e-waste communities? Lastly, what may be reasonably done to
mitigate such negative impacts? We answer these questions via a qua-
litative, mixed methods approach involving semi-structured expert in-
terviews, community interviews, and repeated site visits throughout the
former Katanga province of the DRC, and Accra and Agbogbloshie,
Ghana. Our results reveal truly troubling connections between dec-
arbonisation and ecological destruction, and degradation of community
health, in these regions, alongside issues of gender inequality and pa-
triarchy, child labor, and the dispossession and marginalization of
ethnic groups. Put simply: under current arrangements, cobalt mining
and e-waste processing, so intimately tied to low-carbon energy tran-
sitions, degrade local environmental health, disempower women, ex-
ploit children, and worsen ethnic discrimination. These attributes
question the very idea of sustainable energy generation.
Our study shows that a decarbonized and largely digital economy is
generating a range of serious human and environmental impacts for
communities in the Global South. These impacts are interacting with
already-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities that are structured by
age, class, gender, patterns of globalization and geography. Exploring
these aspects within this study touches on multiple themes and di-
mensions, including energy, environmental and climate justice
(Jenkins 2018), environmental and public health
(Srinivasa et al. 2003), accountability and governance (Bäckstrand
2008), trading patterns and the circulation of global goods and services
(Coe et al., 2004), political economy (Sovacool 2019a), and the unin-
tended implications of policy (Jensen et al., 2015). In particular, the
findings from our study inform debates within at least the three sepa-
rate fields: political ecology, sustainability transitions, and energy jus-
tice.
Firstly, the study contributes to ongoing political ecology delibera-
tions because it seeks to reveal how political, social, economic, and
environmental factors fuse together to create winners and losers, and
worsen some fundamental patterns of exclusion and inequality
(Peet et al., 2011). The supposed “cleanness” and “greenness” of low-
carbon technologies can be questioned to the extent that they depend
on dirty flows of mineral extraction which only perpetuate neocolonial
dependence, economic inequality, and degradation of the environment
(e.g. Dunlap 2018; Sánchez De Jaegher 2018; Zehner 2012). Low-
carbon technologies constitute, critics claim, a continuation of old
patterns of accumulation and degradation, hiding the true costs of
consumption while connecting capital with new “green” markets. They
can even come to displace vulnerable people from their lands or live-
lihood through a process of enclosure and exclusion known as “energy
dispossessions” (Baka 2017). Under such twisted dynamics, proposed
solutions, such as renewable energy or electric vehicles, can transform
into problems.
Secondly, our study attempts to better connect place-specific no-
tions of geography and space to sustainability transitions, to better
comprehend the spatial differentiation of transitions and the power
relations they entail. Lawhon and Murphy (2012: 355) particularly call
for sustainability transitions research to pay greater attention to
“the sustainability of global value chains and production networks” as
well as “globalization and its effect on the sustainability of livelihoods.”
They point to a potential “geographical naïveté” of research that fails to
look at the specific ways in which institutions, actors, knowledge, and
other factors coalesce to create very place specific transitions dynamics.
Bridge et al. (2013: 337) meanwhile state that it is essential to analyze
relationships between the “locations, landscapes and territorialisations
associated with a low-carbon energy transition”. Swilling et al. (2016)
argue that transitions researchers need to better grapple with the socio-
political regimes present within developing countries that can shape
and intertwine with the development or deployment of specific tech-
nologies. Köhler et al. (2019: 16) write that transitions research needs
to more actively consider the ethical considerations and implications of
transitions. Köhler et al. (2019: 8) also implore that researchers ex-
amine “how power is exercised by different actors and structures to
achieve or obstruct sustainability transitions,” and to scrutinize the
“(un)intended political implications of transition processes regarding
structural power inequalities in class, race, gender, and geographical
location” (Köhler et al, 2019:8). The implication across these studies is
the need better reconcile transitions with place-specific expressions of
governance, politics, and power—which we do here.
Our findings lastly buttress growing evidence of global environ-
mental or “energy injustice,” where the benefits and costs of resource
use are exclusionary, racialized and/or gendered (Heiman 1996;
Martuzzi et al., 2010; Fuller and McCauley 2016). Whereas Yenneti and
Day (2015, 2016) and Yenneti et al. (2016) have explored the proce-
dural and distributional injustices related to the implementation of
solar energy projects in India, our study shows the circulation of in-
justices across a Global South and Global North divide. In doing so, the
study responds explicitly to calls for more “multi-scalar” or “whole
systems” thinking within energy justice approaches
(Bickerstaff et al. 2013; Sovacool et al., 2019). Jenkins et al. (2016:179)
compellingly write that “whole systems” approaches are integral in
helping us to gain a fuller understanding of the “entire energy chain,
from mining, conversion, production, transmission, and distribution,
right through to energy consumption and waste.” Bouzarovski and
Simcock (2017: 464) propose an avowedly normative research ap-
proach to whole energy systems that is concerned with attempting to
better understand “the processes through which the relationship be-
tween energy poverty, on the one hand, and wider socio-environmental
contingencies such as climate change, urban and rural social segrega-
tion, and global chains of energy provision, on the other.” It is our hope
that revealing these multi-scalar and whole systems dynamics to in-
justice in this study will help to problematize and contest future low-
carbon transitions and development pathways, pushing them to have
more equitable outcomes.
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2. Background: linking low-carbon transitions to minerals
extraction and electronic waste
In order to introduce and emphasize the link between low-carbon
transitions, mining and metals, and waste, this section provides some
background and future projections.
At the simplest level, a low-carbon transition requires a significant
and sustained shift to low-carbon technologies. According to
IRENA (2018), the number of electric vehicles (EVs) needs to jump from
almost one million in 2015 to one billion cars in 2050 (more precisely
from 1.24 million passenger cars to 965 million passenger cars); from
200,000 electric buses and trucks/lorries to 57 million; and from 200
million electric scooters and bikes to 2.16 billion. The amount of bat-
tery storage similarly needs to climb from 0.5 gigawatt hours (GWh) to
12,380 GWh. The number of heat pumps in households needs to jump
from 20 million to 253 million. IRENA (2018) lastly reports that the
amount of installed solar PV capacity must rise from 223 gigawatts
(GW) to 7122 GW.
The International Energy Agency (IEA), known for being con-
servative in its projections about renewables (Carrington and
Stephenson 2018), has nevertheless presented low carbon energy ex-
pansion scenarios that are correspondingly optimistic. As Fig. 1 shows,
the IEA (2018) anticipates that EVs will rise to at least 125 million cars
and trucks/lorries by 2030. Deployment of installed utility-scale battery
storage systems are expected to jump from a mere 4 GW in 2018 to 220
GW by 2040 (Pavarini 2019). From 2017 to 2023, solar PV is expected
to lead the growth in low-carbon electricity additions, growing by al-
most 570 GW (IEA 2019).
A report from the consulting company McKinsey & Company (2019:
3) assessed these trends, and deduced that “energy companies should be
planning for an industrial revolution driven by renewables” and that
“by 2035, renewables (solar and wind) will account for more than 50%
of global power generation; electric vehicles will be the low-cost option
for car, van and small-truck drivers; oil demand will be declining; and
gas demand will have peaked.”
In terms of the upstream extraction of materials, many types of re-
newable energy and other low-carbon technologies require a multitude
of metals, minerals, and resources in their construction. A recent report
calculated that expected demand for fourteen metals central to the
manufacturing of renewable energy, EVs, and storage technolo-
gies—such as copper, cobalt, nickel, and lithium—will grow substantially
in the next few decades (Dominish et al., 2019). Table 1 shows the top 20
resources (by weight) needed to make an equivalent GW of centralized
low-carbon electricity supply. This ranges from 115,500 tons per GW for
biomass to 602,283 tons for a GW of installed hydroelectricity. More-
over, automation and digitization have already become deeply em-
bedded in most passenger cars available on the market today, with a high
level of computing and sophistication built into vehicles (and thus ma-
terials intensity across those supply chains and sectors). About 40% of
the cost of a standard new vehicle relates to digital devices, sensors,
displays, computers, and electronics (Appleby 2019). These components
all need specialized metals and minerals.
Bazilian (2018: 93) calls this “the mineral foundation” of the energy
transition, and notes it relates not only to low-carbon sources of elec-
tricity such as wind turbines or solar panels, but also to energy-efficient
lamps and lighting, electric vehicles, fuel cells, and batteries for de-
centralized storage. One study projected material stock increases be-
tween 2015 and 2060 for selected technologies, and the numbers are
dizzying: there is an expected increase of 87,000% for battery electric
vehicles, 1000% for wind power, and 3000% for solar PV power
(Månberger and Stenqvist 2018). This could be why the
World Bank (2018: 3) concluded that “the clean energy transition will
be significantly mineral intensive.”
In terms of decentralized low carbon technologies, the metal cobalt
in particular is a critical input into not only batteries but also super-
alloys, plastics and dyes, magnets, and adhesives (Köllner 2018).
Electric vehicles and their lithium ion batteries are now the largest
source of cobalt demand, overtaking mobile phones and consumer
electronics in 2017 (Moores 2018a). ERG (2018), a mining company,
estimates that due to the Paris Agreement, cobalt demand in electric
vehicle batteries will grow by 200% between 2018 and 2020, and again
by 500% by 2025, when the battery market is expected to be worth
$100 billion. Industry projections anticipate that the manufacturing of
lithium ion batteries will more than quadruple from 2018 levels by 2028
(Moores 2019).
At the downstream, or “end of life,” low-carbon systems are in-
creasingly coming to dominate flows of e-waste, especially solar panels,
batteries, and wind turbines. Cucchiella et al. (2015) suggest that solar
energy panels “represent the most significant waste stream” within e-
waste because they are by far the heaviest source by category of weight.
While computer notebooks entail 3.5 kgs of waste and televisions up to
25 kgs of waste, a typical household solar energy system entails 80 kgs
of waste (Cucchiella et al. 2015). A joint report between IRENA and IEA
Fig. 1. Global projections of rising demand for electric vehicles, battery storage,
and solar PV. Source: Authors, compiled by the most recent data from the
International Energy Agency. Note: PLDV = personal light duty vehicle.
PHEV = plug-in hybrid electric vehicle. BEV = battery electric vehicle. LCV = low-
carbon vehicle. PV = photovoltaic. APAC = Asia Pacific.
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(IRENA and IEA-PVPS 2016) estimated that at the upper range, global
solar panel waste amounted to 250,000 t in 2016. However, they noted
that by 2050, solar panels could become equivalent to 10% of global e-
waste streams. They also projected that by 2050, cumulative volumes of
end-of-life solar waste could reach 20 million tons in China, 10 million
tons in the United States, and 7.5 million tons in Japan, or a worldwide
total of 60 to 78 million tons of waste across all countries (see Fig. 2).
This would make solar PV waste flows greater than all e-waste flows in
2018 (Kumar et al. 2017). Greenmatch (2017) put these numbers into
perspective by noting that 60 million tons of solar waste in 2050 would
represent a potential material influx—the amount of wasted solar ma-
terials and components—sufficient to produce 2 billion new panels, or
630 GW of installed capacity worth $11 to 15 billion in recoverable
value. Despite the sheer magnitude and potential value of solar energy
waste, however, such waste streams are only rarely recognized or
currently accounted for, especially in the Global South
(Mulvaney 2013; Mulvaney 2014; Cross and Murray 2018).
Lithium ion batteries are meanwhile one of the fastest growing
contributors to global e-waste (Baldé et al., 2017). Growth in electric
vehicle markets between 2017 and 2030 is expected to create 11 mil-
lion tons of spent lithium ion batteries in need of recycling; as Gardiner
(2017: 2) noted when discerning these trends: “there's going to be a
storm of electric vehicle batteries that will reach the end of their life in
a few years.” However, in the European Union, known for prioritizing
resource efficiency, as little as 5 percent of lithium ion batteries are
currently recycled (Gardiner 2017: 2). Hartley (2019) notes that li-
thium ion batteries are not suitable for landfill, mainly due to possible
reactions with water and toxicity, meaning they must enter e-waste
streams. However, lithium ion batteries are also perceived within the
industry as difficult to recycle given that they can swell and warp, can
produce uncontrolled thermal reactions, and have even been known to
combust when mishandled, as they have in some mobile phones and
electric vehicle applications (SRS Media 2019). The implication is that
such batteries will more likely than not become an additional burden to
e-waste flows rather than be recycled.
Even wind energy contributes to e-waste. Sovacool et al. (2016)
conducted an environmental “profit and loss’” analysis of the manu-
facturing of wind turbines in Northern Europe. They noted that the
materials intensity of wind turbines—involving nacelles, generators,
blades, foundations, hubs, towers, power units, and transformer uni-
ts—precipitates large volumes of e-waste. They calculated that a single
3.1 MW wind turbine created 772 to 1807 tons of landfill waste, 40 to
85 tons of waste sent for incineration and about 7.3 tons of e-waste per
unit. Enevoldsen et al. (2019) project that Europe will need to install at
least 100,000 new wind turbines by 2050. By these calculations, wind
energy will result in another 730,000 tons of e-waste.
3. Case study selection and research methods
Our study was based on a mixed methods research design utilizing
two case studies and data collected via expert interviews, community
interviews, and field research including repeated and multiple site
visits.
3.1. Case selection
To examine the contours of upstream and downstream impacts of
low-carbon transitions on mining and waste processing communities,
we selected two case studies based on their current and projected sig-
nificance in material flows: the Katanga region of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and the Agbogbloshie and Accra districts in
Ghana.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was selected because it
significantly dominates the global production of cobalt. In 2018 the DRC
produced 90,000 tons of unrefined cobalt, or 64.3% of the world's total,
and it had 49% of the world's known cobalt reserves—more than the next
top ten countries in the world combined (U.S. Geological Survey 2019).
Table 1
Materials for Nuclear and Renewable Energy Power Plant Construction (tons/installed GWe).
Source: Sovacool (2010).
Biomass Nuclear Wind Geothermal Hydroelectric Solar
Aluminum 255 18 0 255 240 22,500
Cadmium 0 0 0 0 0 40
Chromium 122 0 0 122 100 0
Concrete 74,257 179,681 305,891 74,257 578,704 60,000
Copper 454 729 211 454 550 2000
Gallium 0 0 0 0 0 3.5
Germanium 0 0 0 0 0 2
Glass 0 0 0 0 0 13
Fiberglass 0 0 19,863 0 0 0
Indium 0 0 0 0 0 20
Lead 0 46 0 0 0 0
Manganese 112 434 0 112 80 0
Molybdenum 42 0 0 42 0 0
Nickel 10 125 0 10 5 0
Plastic 0 0 0 0 0 3250
Silicon 0 0 0 0 0 6500
Silver 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.3
Steel 40,293 36,068 84,565 51,044 32,604 75,000
Tellurium 0 0 0 0 0 46.7
Vanadium 4 0 0 4 0 0
Total 115,550 217,101 410,530 126,300 602,283 169,363
Fig. 2. Projected electronic waste flows associated with solar PV, 2016 to 2050.
Source: Kumar et al. 2017.
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Industry analysts predict that DRC's dominance will only grow in the
future, with the country's share of global cobalt production set to rise to
75% by 2021 (Moores 2018b). Almost all of the DRC's cobalt resources
are concentrated in one region, the “geological scandal” of Katanga
(Sovacool 2019a: 918), which contains an estimated 3.6 million tons of
recoverable cobalt (World Bank 2007). This region of the DRC is shown
in Fig. 3.
Agbogbloshie, a neighborhood within the Greater Accra
Metropolitan Area of Ghana, was chosen because of its high-volumes of
e-waste, which is mostly imported from Europe and North America
(Schluep 2012). Even though it is a relatively small area—less than a
square mile in total size—Agbogbloshie is the “main hub” nationally for
e-waste, being home to at least 40,000 people living and working
around the scrapyard (Akortia et al. 2017). Sovacool (2019b) reports
that more than 90% of e-waste flows within Ghana are processed at
Agbogbloshie, and that the e-waste business there is estimated to be a
$100 million annual enterprise. Agbogbloshie is also unique in its
proximity to local communities and the cohabitation of the scrapyard
alongside a yam market, tomato market, onion market, football pitch,
and mosque (as shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 3).
3.2. Data collection
Our data collection consisted of three different parts: interviews
with experts, interviews with community members and repeated site
visits.
3.2.1. Expert interviews
In the DRC, 23 semi-structured expert research interviews were
conducted between February and April 2019, and in Ghana, 11 semi-
structured expert research interviews were conducted between January
and March 2019. Experts were purposively selected to represent a
variety of institutions involved with knowledge of mining in the DRC,
or e-waste in Ghana. These experts were primarily located in the DRC
and Ghana but also in other locations such as Belgium, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States (to help provide background
and context). Our interview sample included the government agencies
and ministries, international civil society groups, local civil society
groups, private sector firms and organizations, academic institutions,
and independent research institutes shown in Table 2.
In each country, the lead author undertook the field research and
was hosted by local partners, who helped to both identify possible in-
terviewees and facilitate meetings. During each interview, experts were
asked to comment on the risks and benefits low-carbon transitions were
bringing their communities; who was significantly impacted or vul-
nerable; and what policy changes needed implementing. Each interview
lasted between 45 and 120 min, and respondents were guaranteed full
anonymity to encourage candor and protect respondents from potential
retaliation. Each participant was given a unique respondent number
shown in Table 1 (e.g. CER1 to CER23 for the DRC, and GER1 to GER11
for Ghana), referred to throughout in the rest of the paper.
To ensure reliability within the research team, each interview was
fully transcribed, to ensure nothing was missed. Every transcript was
Fig. 3. Case study selection of the Katanga Region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Agbogbloshie Ghana scrapyard for global electronic waste flows.
Source: Mees et al. (2013), Daum et al. (2017). Note: The Katanga Region of the DRC is shown in the grey shaded area of the top panel b.
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coded, and then placed into a single file using a software program
called Nvivo, which allows transcripts to be stored and searched by
keywords and content.
3.2.2. Community interviews
Given the research design sought to understand community per-
ceptions and impacts, expert interviews were coupled with community
interviews (shown in Table 3) throughout the cobalt mining and e-
waste sectors. In the DRC, this involved interviewing artisanal and in-
dustrial cobalt miners (called diggers, creuseurs or kwanda) as well as
artisanal bosses or chiefs, crushers, carriers, drivers, refiners, safety
inspectors, sorters, labor unions and even members of the mining po-
lice. In Ghana, this involved interviewing e-waste scrapyard workers at
Agbogbloshie (and their families), labor leaders, politicians, and those
supporting miners via marketing and vending. In total, 48 community
interviews were conducted in the DRC, and 21 were conducted in
Ghana, following the same questions or “script” as the expert inter-
views. These interviews tended to be shorter than the expert interviews.
Each respondent was guaranteed anonymity, and also assigned a un-
ique respondent number (e.g. CCR1 to CCR48 for the DRC, and GCR1 to
GCR21 for Ghana).
The same transcription and coding protocol for the expert inter-
views was applied to these community interviews.
3.2.3. Site visits
Finally, to complement the interviews, extensive site visits were
undertaken throughout the DRC and Ghana. In the DRC, this involved
30 site visits to: 1 archive of mining documents, 11 large scale and
industrial mines, 2 smelters, 10 artisanal mines, 6 artisanal trading
depots, and 1 artisanal refinery or processing center shown in Table 4.
The visits included a mix of mines owned by different entities (Aus-
tralian, Congolese, Chinese, South African, joint ventures) and locations
(Fungurume, Kisanfu, Kolwezi, Likasi, Lubumbashi, Mulunwishi, and
Museba), as well as active and inactive mining sites, legal and illegal
sites, and sites at exploration phases but also production and decom-
missioning phases. In Ghana, this involved 20 site visits to: three se-
parate visits to the Agbogbloshie scrapyard and neighborhood but also
local waste collection sites, electrical repair shops, recycling centers,
and community e-waste dumps on the periphery of Accra. Each of these
naturalistic site visits lasted between 20 and 180 min.
Finally, the study presents a fairly large number of photographs and
images related to cobalt mining in the Congo and e-waste in Ghana,
collected during the fieldwork. Explicit permission was given by each
participant to use these photos in our research outputs. Fig. 4 showcases
three of the field research sites in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and two of these sites in Ghana.
For all community interviews and site visits, in the DRC the lead
author travelled with a team of Congolese research assistants who
spoke English, French, and local languages. In Ghana the lead author
travelled with a team of Ghanaian research assistants who spoke
English and local languages. In the DRC, the research team was given
exceptional access as our Ordre de Mission, our permit to undertake
research, was sponsored collectively by the University of Lubumbashi,
the Congolese Ministry of Education, both the provincial governors of
Haut-Katanga (home to the mines in Likasi and Lubumbashi) and
Lualaba (home to the mines in Kolwezi and Fungurume), and the
Congolese Secret Service. Our team also included a justice advocate, a
Congolese lawyer, to enhance the legitimacy of the visits, but also to
minimize opportunities for corruption. In Ghana, the team was given
repeated access to Agbogbloshie because we were hosted by the School
Table. 2
Expert interview respondents relating to cobalt mining in the DRC and e-waste in Ghana, 2019.
Source: Authors.
No. Institution Country
CER1 University of Liège Belgium
CER2 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence UK
CER3 Centre for environment and health, ku leuven Belgium
CER4 University of Groningen Netherlands
CER5 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH DRC
CER6 University of Bath UK
CER7 University of Liège Belgium
CER8 Institute for Development Studies UK
CER9 Colorado School of Mines USA
CER10 Environmental Studies Department, San Jose State University USA
CER11 Université de Kinshasa DRC
CER12 Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM), recently renamed SAEMAPE DRC
CER13 Ministry of Mines DRC
CER14 German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) DRC
CER15 Universite de Lubumbashi DRC
CER16 Universite de Lubumbashi DRC
CER17 Universite de Lubumbashi DRC
CER18 The Carter centre DRC
CER19 The Carter centre DRC
CER20 The Carter centre DRC
CER21 Glencorps DRC
CER22 University of Delaware USA
CER23 Resource Matters DRC
GER1 Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana Ghana
GER2 Institute for African Studies Ghana
GER3 Institute for Environment and Sanitation Studies Ghana
GER4 School of Public Health, University of Ghana Ghana
GER5 Environment Protection Agency (EPA) Ghana
GER6 Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI) Ghana
GER7 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Ghana
GER8 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Ghana
GER9 Scrap Dealers Association at Agbogbloshie Ghana
GER10 Greater Accra Scrap Dealers Association Ghana
GER11 World Resources Forum and Green Advocacy Ghana
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of Health at the University of Ghana, who was building a health clinic
onsite, as well as the Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency, who
was monitoring pollution levels.
3.3. Study limitations
Despite an attempt at triangulation within the selected methods, our
approach does have some notable weaknesses. Although we sought to
include a diverse mix of stakeholders in our interviews, respondents
were speaking of their perceptions (meaning some could have stated
misperceptions) and were also speaking on their own behalf, not on
behalf of their institutions. Moreover, due to presenting a wealth of
original empirical material spread across the two case studies, we did
not have sufficient space in this paper to conduct a rigorous literature
review to confirm all of our findings. We lastly did not make an attempt
to weight, correct, normalize, or problematize data across our methods,
to avoid censoring our results and discussion, and also to meet the
energy justice principle of “recognition,” treating everyone's concerns
as valid (Jenkins et al., 2016; Sovacool et al., 2019).
4. Results: aggravated vulnerabilities within the “decarbonisation
divide”
Despite the limitations above, the three methods together, and the
photographs, resulted in the collection of a rich, unique qualitative
dataset that extensively document the costs and risks to cobalt mining
and e-waste recycling and reclamation. Four sets of vulnerabilities seem
most acute in this so-called “decarbonisation divide,” and will be dis-
cussed in the sections to come: environmental and public health risks;
gender discrimination and the marginalization of women; child labor
and exploitation; and the subjugation of ethnic groups.
4.1. Environmental and public health
Even though the Congolese and Ghanaian communities end up ei-
ther supplying critical metals to low-carbon technologies, or processing
their waste flows, the environmental and public health risks associated
with cobalt mining and e-waste processing are sizable, multifaceted,
and persistent.
Table 3
Community interview respondents in the DRC and Ghana, 2019.
Source: Authors.
No. Title Institution Location
CCR1 Safety Coordinator Gécamines (state-owned mining company) Lubumbashi, DRC
CCR2 Industrial miner Gécamines (state-owned mining company) Kinshasa, DRC
CCR3 Safety inspector L'entreprise minière Congo Dongfang Mining (CDM) Lubumbashi, DRC
CCR4 Digger Artisanal miner, Ruashi Lubumbashi, DRC
CCR5 Digger Artisanal miner, Ruashi Lubumbashi, DRC
CCR6 Digger and sorter Artisanal miner, Ruashi Lubumbashi, DRC
CCR7 Driver Nyati Cross Border Transport (Copper transport and logistics) Lubumbashi, DRC
CCR8 Owner/manager/boss Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, DRC
CCR9-14 Diggers Kasulo Artisanal mine Kolwezi, DRC
CCR15-17 Sorters and carriers Depot 169 Kolwezi, DRC
CCR18 Carrier Depot 169 Kolwezi, DRC
CCR19-21 Refiners/melters Depot 2 Kolwezi, DRC
CCR22 Carrier Depot 1000 Kolwezi, DRC
CCR23 Refiner/melter Depot 1000 Kolwezi, DRC
CCR24 Crusher Depot Thomas Boss Billy Kisanfu, DRC
CCR25 Sorter Depot Thomas Boss Billy Kisanfu, DRC
CCR26 Sorter and carrier Depot Thomas Boss Billy Kisanfu, DRC
CCR27 Industrial miner Tenke Fungurume Mine Fungurume, DRC
CCR28 Industrial miner Ruashi Mining (operating at TFM) Fungurume, DRC
CCR29 Manager/boss Solola and Kabica Artisanal Mines Fungurume, DRC
CCR30-33 Diggers Solola and Kabica Artisanal Mines Fungurume, DRC
CCR34 Boss/dealer/trader Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, DRC
CCR35-39 Digger Katanga and Fungurume Artisanal Mines Fungurume, DRC
CCR40 Captain Fungurume Mining Police Fungurume, DRC
CCR41 President Fungurume Mining Negotiator Association Fungurume, DRC
CCR42 Officer Fungurume Mining Police Fungurume, DRC
CCR43 Chief Depot 18 Museba, DRC
CCR44-45 Sorters and crushers Depot 18 Museba, DRC
CCR46 Boss/manager Kawama Artisanal Mine Lubumbashi, DRC
CCR47-48 Diggers Kawama Artisanal Mine Lubumbashi, DRC
GCR1 Community resident Greater Accra Scrap Dealers Association Accra, Ghana
GCR2-3 Scrap collector Self-employed Accra, Ghana (airport residential area)
GCR4 Scrap driver Self-employed Accra, Ghana
GCR5 Repairer Progressive Electronics Technicians Accra, Ghana
GCR6 Repairer Kojo God is Great Electronics Accra, Ghana
GCR7 Chief Scrap workers gang Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR8-9 Burners Scrap workers gang Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR10 Collector Scrap workers gang Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR11 Repairer My Son Electrical Shop Sege, Ghana
GCR12 Former Chairman Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR13 Manager for sorting Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR14 Manager for repairing Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR15 Manager for transport Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR16 Dismantler Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR17 Manager for weighing Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR18 Chairman Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
GCR19-21 Vice-bosses Accra Scrap Dealers Association Agbogbloshie, Ghana
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In the DRC, it is important to distinguish between two types of co-
balt mining, large-scale industrial mining (often abbreviated as LSM,
and owned by foreign firms), and artisanal and small-scale mining
(abbreviated as ASM, and usually owned by local communities). LSM
cobalt mining techniques account for about 80% of national produc-
tion, employ much larger machinery and a high degree of mechaniza-
tion and automation, usually using a mix of surface scrapers, bulldo-
zers, and diggers, as well as excavators, dump trucks, dynamite, and
acid (Sovacool 2019a). A single LSM cobalt and copper mine can pro-
duce more than 8 million tons per year (though most of that is copper).
ASM, by contrast, accounts for 20% of production but 98% of the
workforce. It is low-tech, labor-intensive, and highly dangerous for the
miners. CCR8, a miner, told the authors that:
We mine cobalt in teams, usually 5–6 in a team though sometimes they
can be as small as 4, or as large as 15. We use simple tools, such as a
shovel and a pick axe. We mine at night, usually beginning at 5pm and
going all the way until the sun rises the next day, around 6am, so a 13 h
shift. We dig a large room to ‘live’ in and then we remove side blocks or
‘rooms’ of cobalt and copper. Sometimes we just stay in the mine.
CER4, an industry expert, cautioned that “I wouldn't even call arti-
sanal mining, it's really collecting or scavenging, they don't have equipment
to mine, they just dig.” Fig. 5, for example, shows two ASM cobalt mines
near Kasulu and Kawama that were little more than holes in the ground.
Table 4
Naturalistic observation and site visits in the DRC and Ghana, 2019.
Source: Authors.
a. Congolese site visits
No. Institution Type Description Location
1 Katanga Artisanal Mine Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Fungurume, DRC
2 Tenke Fungurume Mine (TFM) Industrial Copper and cobalt mine Fungurume, DRC
3 Kabica Artisanal Mine Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Fungurume, DRC
4 Solola Artisanal Mine Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Fungurume, DRC
5 Tenke Fungurume Mine Concession Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Fungurume, DRC
6 Depot Laylay Artisanal trader Copper and cobalt trader Kisanfu, DRC
7 Depot Thomas Boss Billy Artisanal trader Copper and cobalt trader Kisanfu, DRC
8 Lualaba Copper Smelter Industrial smelter Copper smelter Kolwezi, DRC
9 Mutanda Mining Industrial mine Copper and cobalt mine Kolwezi, DRC
10 La Sino-Congolaise des Mines (Sicomines) Industrial mine Copper and cobalt mine Kolwezi, DRC
11 Kasulo Artisanal mine Cobalt mine Kolwezi, DRC
12 Djoni Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Kolwezi, DRC
13 Depot 2 Artisanal trader Copper and cobalt trader Kolwezi, DRC
14 Depot 1000 Artisanal trader Copper and cobalt trader Kolwezi, DRC
15 Depot 169 Artisanal refinery Copper and cobalt trader and refinery Kolwezi, DRC
16 CDM Kasulo Industrial mine Copper and cobalt mine Kolwezi, DRC
17 Shituru Mining Corporation (SMCO) Industrial mine Copper mine Likasi, DRC
18 Gécamines Midema Concession Industrial mine Copper and cobalt mine Likasi, DRC
19 Likasi Artisanal Mine 1 Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Likasi, DRC
20 Likasi Artisanal Mine 2 Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Likasi, DRC
21 centre de documentation sur le katanga et les regions avoisinantes (cedeka) Archive Repository for mining documents Lubumbashi, DRC
22 Gécamines copper smelter Industrial smelter Copper smelter and slag storage Lubumbashi, DRC
23 L'entreprise minière Congo Dongfang Mining (CDM) Industrial mine Copper and cobalt mine Lubumbashi, DRC
24 Huachin Mining Industrial mine Copper and cobalt mine Lubumbashi, DRC
25 Rwashi Mining Commune Industrial and artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Lubumbashi, DRC
26 MMG Industrial mine Copper and cobalt mine Lubumbashi, DRC
27 Kawama Artisanal Mine Artisanal mine Copper and cobalt mine Lubumbashi, DRC
28 CHEMAF Industrial Cobalt and copper Lubumbashi, DRC
29 Depot Samy 888 Artisanal trader Copper trader Mulunwishi, DRC
30 Depot 18 Artisanal trader Copper and cobalt trader Museba, DRC
b. Ghanaian site visits
No. Institution Location
1 Prodick Electrical Accra, Ghana
2 Comfort Coolair and Electrical Services Accra, Ghana
3 Progressive Electronics Technicians Accra, Ghana
4 Kojo Broni Phone and Laptop Repairs Accra, Ghana
5 Electricals Accra, Ghana
6 Kojo God is King Electrical Works Accra, Ghana
7 Old Fadama Market Agbogbloshie, Ghana
8 Agbogbloshie scrapyard Agbogbloshie, Ghana
9 My Son Electrical Shop Sege, Ghana
10 Dawa Steel Mill / Export Zone Dawa, Ghana
11 Adom Phone Repairs and Computer Hardware Tema, Ghana
12 Samuel Refrigeration and Electrical Services Dawhenya, Ghana
13 Republic Electrical New Dawhenya, Ghana
14 Accra Compost & Recycling Plant (ACARP) Accra, Ghana
15 Akooshi Recycling centre Accra, Ghana
16 Agbogbloshie scrapyard Agbogbloshie, Ghana
17 Old Fadama Market Agbogbloshie, Ghana
18 Agbogbloshie scrapyard Agbogbloshie, Ghana
19 Old Fadama Market Agbogbloshie, Ghana
20 Agbogbloshie Health Clinic Agbogbloshie, Ghana
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Such mining techniques pose a severe risk to both the miners
themselves and the communities they support. CCR2, who had decades
of experience in the cobalt mining industry, stated that:
Cobalt mining here in all its varieties has massive environmental con-
sequences, and very little attention from government as to what is going
on. Those impacts are underestimated, with no comprehensive view.
People mainly look at dust and water, and plant contamination. If you
visit in the dry season, it's like living in a permanent sandstorm, a cloud
hangs over the collective mining properties. Technically companies or
mining cooperatives should water the roads to minimize dust, but they
don't. Then you have pollution of fruits and vegetables, other studies
looking at urine concentrations at artisanal sites, as well as high rates of
heavy metals in urine and blood, especially children.
Numerous articles have confirmed the depth and extent of en-
vironmental pollution associated with cobalt mining, including the
exposure of mining teams to uranium and toxic metals (Banza Lubaba
Fig. 4. Congolese Cobalt mining communities and Ghanaian e-waste scrapyards and dumps. Source: Authors.
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Nkulu et al. 2018), as well as the pollution of drinking and bathing
water with heavy metals (Tsurukawa et al., 2011). The World
Bank (2008: 23) called the environmental impacts of ASM in the DRC as
“deplorable,” and it noted the multifaceted way that such activities can
ravage the local environment. This includes direct biodiversity loss and
deforestation through mines and disposal sites, as well as air pollution
through emissions and discharges. Processing slimes (thick sludge from
mining operations) and tailings damage wetlands and change the flow
modification and sedimentation patterns of rivers. Mining tunnels
contribute to soil erosion, land instability, and ground subsidence, and
toxic dust coats everything around a mine. Indeed, although the mine is
only one vector, pollution also occurs across other aspects of the life-
cycle including slurry sites, trading depots, and processing stations.
Fig. 6 attempts to visualize the multiple externalities associated with
cobalt mining.
These factors culminate in a toxic environment. And yet commu-
nities have become addicted to mining. As CER5 put it:
The cobalt boom has created a social norm that to escape poverty you
must mine. The entire community however becomes a mine, people just
start digging, everywhere, under churches and farms, under homes and
cafes. They know they can earn more money in mining than agriculture,
so it diverts resources, and creates more mining. People are proud to have
several family members working in mines, you are seen as stupid if you
don't do it, parents are even proud if they have children at mines. Mines
are not seen as harmful, they are seen as an elevator lifting them out of
poverty. In reality, however, mining prevents families from diversifying
their incomes, or creating small businesses, or investing in education or
alternatives. It traps them into a life of cobalt. It lures them into a lifestyle
that will ultimately kill them.
This complex social norm in favor of mining likely explains why
more communities do not reject mining activities.
The environmental and health calamities of e-waste in Ghana are
just as stark, given that e-waste contains hazardous and toxic
Fig. 5. Artisanal cobalt mines near Kasulu (Kolwezi) and Kawama (Lubumbashi), DRC, 2019. Source: Authors.
Fig. 6. Multifaceted externalities with cobalt mining in the DRC. Source: Authors.
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substances such as lead, mercury, cadmium, and flame retardants
alongside valuable minerals such as gold or copper. The Ghanaian
Environmental Protection Agency warns that a host of toxic elements
reside within e-waste streams, including capacitors containing poly-
chlorinated biphenyls, gas discharge lamps, batteries, plastics con-
taining brominated flame retardants, liquid crystal displays, external
electric cables and electrolyte capacitors. These often also contain as-
bestos, mercury, refractory ceramic fibers, and radioactive substances
(see Fig. 7) (Ghanaian Environmental Protection Agency 2018).
In particular, the practices used in battery disposal and recycling are
extremely hazardous. At Agbogbloshie, batteries from electric vehicles
and other devices are subject to uncontrolled acid drainage, as well as
hazardous methods for breaking batteries with machetes
(Atiemo et al. 2016; Sovacool 2019b). Insufficient dust-control mea-
sures exist in recycling and smelting facilities, with broken and uneven
ground-cover that prohibits disassembly and cleaning, nonexistent
washing of secondary plastics resulting in cross-contamination with
lead-oxide, insufficient personal protective equipment for workers, and
the complete absence of health and safety monitoring for workers and
neighboring communities (Atiemo et al. 2016).
GER4 linked these environmental impacts to the health of the local
population: “when one assesses the determinants of health, many illnesses
have environmental causes. Mortality is due to one's neighborhood en-
vironment, where they live before death, and it is here where e-waste acts as
one of the most potent sources of morbidity.” GER4 went on to explain
that:
At Agbogbloshie, they use only the most rudimentary means of e-waste
processing, such as acid leaching, manual dismantling, and burning,
which creates serious health problems among the workers themselves.
However, children are also vulnerable. Young children live or attend
schools close to the site that have many heavy metals in their urine.
Children between ages 12 and 15 already have kidney failure, body
systems like 90 year old adults. Pregnant women are also vulnerable,
with linkages to cancer and birth defects emerging.
Environmental impacts are worsened because those working in the
sector do not have access to, or follow, environmental standards. As
GCR1 explained, “communities have tried to give hand gloves and protective
clothing, but they tend not to use them, just resell.”
Worsening matters, the sites at the scrapyard where acid leeching,
burning, and dismantling take place are located adjacent to a series of
food markets, and some of the scrap itself is recycled into cooking pots
and kettles, which respondents argued then further release toxics into
food. Moreover, smoke from the burning of waste blankets the entire
community, as Fig. 8 indicates. One study found that, unexpectedly,
blood levels for lead were higher in e-waste non-workers (i.e., com-
munity residents living nearby) than for that of e-waste workers at
Agbogbloshie (Amankwaa et al. 2017)—probably because the workers
are onsite only during shifts, but the community residents live there.
Other health monitoring has indicated that polychlorinated biphenyls
exposure of people living in Accra not involved in e-waste activities were
higher than those directly involved (Wittsiepe et al. 2015;
Sovacool 2019b). These health dynamics pose a distinct moral hazard
to e-waste activity because they engender undue burdens on those who
have nothing to do with its processing, and do not necessarily consent
to being involved or polluted.
Most worryingly, as in the DRC and mining, such health risks are
tacitly accepted as “worth it” and necessary to climb to a higher stan-
dard of living. GER 4 explained that:
It [Agbogbloshie] is a huge market for a population otherwise with no
means of survival in the urban environment. These people, they are not
stupid, they know the health risks, but they think: isn't dying slowly better
than already dead?
Such a statement implies that better information and education, by
itself, will do little to minimize hazardous e-waste activities because
many community members already understand a degree of the risks
involved and see them as tolerable.
4.2. Gender disempowerment and the marginalization of women
A second area of vulnerability relates to marginalization and dis-
empowerment of women, as well as the entrenchment of patterns of
patriarchy and gender inequalities.
In the DRC, respondents argued that women were legally forbidden
to mine—it was believed by many experts to be illegal under the
National Mining Code, although this fact was contested in the litera-
ture. In reality women often do mine, performing some of the most
difficult or intensive tasks for less pay than men. As CER8 explained:
Cobalt mining activities are very gendered: For example, you rarely find
women going into the pits and digging, but they play a central role in
cleaning, processing, transporting, and trading. Prostitution is rife in
mining camps, and sex workers are among the most vulnerable to pov-
erty, and also violence, in particular because they are often internal
migrants with few local connections or support networks.
CER20 argued that women generally “don't get access to the best
mining sites” and that even when they do find sites they can mine, “they
Fig. 7. Multifaceted externalities with e-waste processing in Ghana. Source: Authors.
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don't get paid equal revenue, they don't have the physical strength of men,
they fall sick more often or are more easily harmed.”
The site visits confirmed these findings, with dozens of women (and
girls) observed digging for cobalt, carrying and sorting the minerals,
and conducting support activities such as selling vegetables to miners
and hauling water. The World Bank (2007) noted across the ASM sector
broadly that Congolese women constituted a growing proportion of
miners and workers but, due to their low status, were generally forced
to undertake the most strenuous or poorly paid activities, or become
involved in mining under pressure from their husbands or families.
The literature also notes a collection of other indirect effects of ASM
mining on gender relations that aggravate gender inequality.
Fig. 8. Smoke and dust from e-waste processing at Agbogbloshie adjacent to markets for onions, tomatoes, and vegetables. Source: Authors.
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Hinton et al. (2013) argue that many of the health impacts from mining
are gendered, with women facing specific illness, injury, and stress as
well as extreme exertion and exhaustion from very labor-intensive ac-
tivities (i.e., digging for several hours, hauling heavy loads long dis-
tances, bending over in awkward positions). Moreover, women in
mining communities in the DRC, especially sex workers, face the ever
present risk of contracting dangerous contagious diseases being spread
by miners, many of them migrants, including HIV/AIDS, diarrhea, he-
patitis, meningitis, cholera, typhoid, tetanus, typhus, malaria, yellow
fever, and tuberculosis (Tsurukawa et al., 2011). These health risks are
gendered because women are more likely than men to be prostitutes,
and also given they are at the lower rungs of the mining hierarchy,
women are more exposed to unsafe conditions and chronic injuries.
Women's gendered and centrally-important roles at Agbogbloshie
also expose them to additional risks. GER10 noted that “women are
exposed to all of the same toxins and risks as men, but are forbidden by
culture to actually do the sorting or burning—instead they do menial tasks
such as selling water or cooking food.” Fig. 9 shows two women onsite
preparing fruits or selling snacks. As a consequence, mothers within
Agbogbloshie have been shown to have high levels of PCBs in their
blood (Asamoah et al. 2018) as well as very high rates of endocrine
disruption and neurotoxicity (Frazzoli et al. 2010; Daum et al. 2017), in
addition to abnormally high rates of spontaneous abortions, stillbirths,
and premature births (Grant and Oteng-Ababio 2012). It also falls on
women, as GER3 noted, to continue to “care for children, manage a
household, and assist their husbands, or parents, all the while conducting
ancillary e-waste activities, all without pay.”
4.3. Child labor and exploitation
A third disturbing finding is that both cobalt mining and e-waste
processing depend significantly on child labor.
In the DRC, children work extensively in the cobalt mining sector
due to the absence of available schooling, and/or the need to support
siblings or themselves (as many are orphans). CER2 remarked that
“children are in artisanal cobalt mines as the only way to feed themselves or
their family.” The International Labor Organization (ILO) classifies child
mining for cobalt as one of the “worst forms of child labor”
(Amnesty International 2016), since it exposes children to physical and
at times psychological and sexual abuse; requires working
Fig. 9. Women preparing fruits or selling snacks for e-waste burners and collectors at Agbogbloshie, 2019. Source: Authors.
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underground, underwater, at dangerous heights, or in confined spaces;
involves dangerous equipment and tools as well as the manual handling
of heavy loads; places children in unhealthy work environments that
expose children to toxic substances, agents, and processes; and it ne-
cessitates difficult conditions including working for long hours or at
night.
Children are required to routinely carry sacks of ore that weigh
more than they do. Respondents reported that children are also often
exposed to physical abuse and beatings, whippings, and attempted
drownings from security guards, as well as drug abuse, violence, and
sexual exploitation. Some children are reportedly exploited financially
by traders and bosses who refuse to even weigh their products, instead
paying them substandard (and below market) rates for sacks of cobalt
based on visually (under)estimated weights. CER3, an expert on
mining, explained that:
The cobalt mining sector is littered with children. And these child miners
are in such bad shape that many will die before they ever become an
adult. They will get buried alive in an underground tunnel, or drowned in
a waterlogged pit. In the slightly longer term, they can even develop
cancer, things like pneumonia, malnutrition, or they start dying from
AIDS. There is so much prostitution as well, spreading these diseases.
Why do the children do it? They may make twice to three times what they
could earn in another job.
CCR4, a digger who stated he was fourteen but looked less than ten
years old, said that he “works 10 to 14 h a day, when there is daylight, so
that I can send money to my sisters and my mother. Sometimes, at night, I
will sneak into the concession to look for copper, cobalt, and malachite,
though I need to watch out for the dogs and the guards. I make about $0.50
a day.” CCR6, another young miner, told the authors he was an “or-
phan” and that he “mines cobalt with a shovel to support three younger
siblings.” Fig. 10 shows one young miner covered in mud after leaving a
tunnel to wash cobalt.
These young miners are not exceptions. CER8 estimated that “child
labor is practiced extensively.” Based on surveys in 150 mining commu-
nities in the Katanga region of the DRC, Faber et al. (2017) estimated
that about 23% of children worked in the cobalt mining sector. A re-
search team from BGR (2019) also visited 58 copper and cobalt mines
in the DRC, and they detected the presence of children at 17 mines (or
29%). In 11 of these mines, children carried out fairly heavy labor in-
cluding handpicking, washing, sorting ore, and working underground.
Only in 8 of these mines were parents of the children present.
Similar conditions can be found in Agbogbloshie, Ghana, with
children making up a large proportion of the labor force working at the
site, with some directly working as e-waste collectors, some indirectly
supporting the waste workers by selling food or providing services, and
others merely residing there. GCR1, an expert on e-waste, explained
that:
Today, the e-waste problem's getting bigger and bigger by the day, which
means the future is very bleak for the children of Agbogbloshie. Second
hand electronic material continues to be dumped in the area too, from
around the world … I encounter children sleeping on scrap, eating with e-
waste, coughing intensely, bleeding. I am not a health professional, but I
can tell they are dying.
GCR16, a dismantler of e-waste, told the authors he had been
working at Agbogbloshie for two years. He started working when he
was twelve; he has no family, so he spends all his earnings on himself.
He stated that “copper from e-waste is my livelihood. I like what I do, it was
better than working in the fields in a farm or selling water at the side of the
road. I get skills. I get respect. I can make $100 a month, compared to other
things, and live like a king.” GCR17, a burner, also stated that he was 14
(though he looked much younger), and that he had been working there
for five years, meaning he started as a scavenger when he was 9. He
gave a different assessment of his livelihood: “No, I don't like my job.
Who would like this? But, it keeps my family fed, and that is what matters.”
There is even a football pitch inside the scrapyard and little boys and
girls are known to work alongside collectors and burners. During the
repeated site visits, more than 100 children were observed, including
the one in Fig. 11 who is dismantling a television set and desktop
computer.
4.4. Subjugation of ethnic and migrant minorities
A final concern is how cobalt mining and e-waste processing further
worsen ethnic inequalities and exacerbate the marginalization of par-
ticular ethnic groups and refugees.
In the DRC, millions of people have had to survive two civil wars,
repeated invasions by foreign armies, epidemics of diseases such as
cholera, malaria, HIV/AIDS and Ebola, militia activity, and ethnic
conflict. The United Nations Human Rights Commission (2019) projects
that the DRC is home to 4.5 million displaced persons and more than
530,000 refugees. This has collectively created an extremely large po-
pulation of displaced persons and ex-combatants who constitute a
surplus labor pool of migratory workers (refugees) (World Bank 2007).
Consequently, CER1 argued that migrants and some ethnic groups were
the most vulnerable within the mining sector. As they explained:
New miners, often migrants or refugees, find themselves extremely vul-
nerable when they start cobalt mining, as they need to learn a new set of
skills in a very dangerous environment. There are ethnic dimensions to
vulnerability, also, as the system is predicated on displaced persons
Fig. 10. Child labor at the Kasulu artisanal cobalt mine in the DRC. Source:
Authors.
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working for artisanal mining bosses trying to stay rich and keep others,
less experienced miners or different ethnic groups, poor as a result. So
socioeconomic class mixes with ethnicity for vulnerability … Certain
ethnic groups are more psychologically vulnerable, some better off than
others, some have connections with security people (family connections)
or traders in the family who can give them money. But it is the refugee
artisanal miners who are physically, financially, and economically at the
bottom of the pile. They are hidden and invisible, since extraction is often
clandestine.
CER8 affirmed this point when they noted that while cobalt mining
practices may not create new inequalities, they worsen already existing
inequalities and patterns of discrimination, saying “I would say that
those most exposed to exploitative use of labor are those already most
marginalized within Congolese societies - for example, marginalized com-
munities such as the pygmies, not usually employed in mining but displaced
by it. The inequalities in terms of work conditions map onto and reinforce
existing inequalities of ethnicity, race, class, and social status.”
Furthermore, the precarious legality of ASM cobalt mining was said
by several of our respondents to subject mining teams to discrimination
by foreign firms, mining bosses, local trading companies, the mining
police, the local police, and the national secret service. Multiple miners
discussed being taken advantage of by either the bosses they worked
for, the companies they sold cobalt to, or LSM operations that artifi-
cially depressed the price of cobalt. These findings were confirmed by
Sovacool (2019a).
Similar patterns of ethnic discrimination occur at Agbogbloshie.
There, migratory workers to the site are also given the worst jobs ac-
cording to their religion or ethnicity. GER7 states that “new e-waste
workers are extremely exposed … when they arrive, they are placed at the
bottom of the scrapyard hierarchy and are given the most toxic jobs, such as
burning.” GCR12, who oversaw many aspects of management at the
scrapyard, noted that the sheer growth in e-waste has attracted large
numbers of refugees and migrants, who have flocked there for the
employment opportunities, saying:
The size of operations at Agbogbloshie has doubled in the past 10 years.
We have seen this in a doubling of the volume of waste being handled, the
waste being stockpiled and repaired. We see this in the tripling of the
people now living here, as well as the revenues we generate. But we have
also seen this in the number of different ethnic groups—we had fewer
than 6 ten years ago, but now have almost 20.
During the site visits, it was the newer arrivals from the Northern
Provinces of Ghana, or immigrants from Benin and Togo, who were
seen burning, almost never those from the Southern Provinces or
longer-time residents of Agbogbloshie. Such migrants lack the social
ties of longtime residents, face language barriers, and are presumably
easier to exploit. The sleeping quarters for new workers also consisted
simply of collections of metal pipes that people collapsed onto, with
bricks for an armrest or pillow. Other new arrivals were so marginalized
they were not permitted to burn, with the “lowest” members of the
hierarchy searching through the dump after things were burnt, essen-
tially searching for the scraps of the scraps.
5. Policy implications and recommendations
The preceding analysis highlights four injustices manifest in the
extraction and disposal of low carbon technologies in the DRC and
Ghana: deteriorating environmental health, enhanced gender inequal-
ities, child exploitation, and ethnic or religious discrimination. Yet all
too often these upstream and downstream impacts are ignored in policy
discussions which focus narrowly on the expected “emissions gains” of
expansions in, and diffusions of, low carbon technologies. As CER9
argued, “minerals are such a critical and necessary component of low-
carbon transitions but are oddly invisible to most policymakers or con-
sumers. Awareness of this entire topic is lacking.” GER8 added that “issues
of e-waste are some of the lowest on the policy agenda, especially when
compared to more visible waste flows of say plastics or human waste.”
In addition to being invisible, such risks are often interlinked. CCR3
suggested as much when they noted that:
The most vulnerable [to the impacts of mining], the poor and polluted,
can be broken into three categories: workers, children, women. Indeed, I
have seen studies of congenital defects, the risk of being born with a risk
defect is higher if your father has a mining related job. The health of
communities is under siege due to cobalt mining.
Such interconnected risks, which cut across our categories of health,
gender, child labor, and ethnic division, demand holistic policy inter-
ventions as a response.
Thus, as well as identifying vulnerabilities, injustices and inequal-
ities, we also asked expert respondents and community participants
what reforms and policy changes need to occur to make cobalt mining
and e-waste processing more sustainable. All in all, our respondents
Fig. 11. Child labor at the Agbogbloshie Ghana e-waste scrapyard. Source: Authors.
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identified 24 distinct recommendations, summarized in Table 5 and
organized across supra-regional and global, national and regional, and
local and community scales. This list shows only the policy options
mentioned in multiple interviews (and are thus interpreted to be more
credible and feasible).
This laundry list of policies goes well beyond single options such as
“ethical minerals” (Hilson et al., 2016) and attempts at improving the
traceability of cobalt supplies. Such efforts include ERG's “Clean Cobalt
Initiative,” First Cobalt's “Responsible Cobalt Initiative,” RCS Global's
“Better Cobalt” program, and the World Economic Forum's “Global
Battery Alliance.” However, CER6 warned that:
My worry is due diligence with supply chains via mining companies and
electronics companies will become a technocratic tick the box exercise,
putting a tag saying this is clean cobalt. But that won't really benefit the
local Congolese, it won't improve incomes for miners, nor will it lead to
better labor conditions.
Similar global efforts such as the Global Mining Initiative, the
Mines, Minerals and Sustainable Development Initiative, and the
Bettercoal initiative have been criticized as “greenwash” and Public
Relations exercises that didn't improve the ecological and social con-
ditions for affected communities (Corpuz and Kennedy 2001;
Nostromo Research 2002; Whitmore 2006; Dashwood 2012; Brock and
Dunlap 2018), largely because they failed to address underlying causes
such as poverty, inequality, or environmental degradation.
In parallel, much attention in the literature has emphasized priva-
tization, financing and formalization as a solution to “informal” or
“illegal” activities such as ASM (Hilson et al., 2017; Hinton et al., 2003)
or e-waste processing (Atiemo et al. 2016). Our data, however,
suggested a much broader array of options that extend beyond ethical
minerals, certification schemes, and formalization.
Within the DRC, for example, our respondents discussed how better
environmental management and reclamation at LSM mines would im-
prove community health, and broader and more robust community
benefit sharing agreements would ensure the Congolese themselves
benefit more directly from mining. Mining communities could diversify
away from mining to support training for alternative livelihoods, or
share a broader set of benefits with a more diverse group of stake-
holders. For example, Canada already utilizes Impact-Benefit
Agreements, or IBAs, to ensure that communities surrounding mining
projects benefit directly and/or are compensated for negative impacts if
they occur (O'Reilly and Eacott 1999–2000).
Within Ghana, better data collection and sorting of e-wastes could
help separate streams and track flows. Interviewees suggested that
training programs and educational platforms could minimize environ-
mental hazards and promote more awareness about gender equality and
child protection. Improved recycling programs, including sufficient
enforcement and monitoring, for e-waste in Europe and North America
would ensure less waste is exported, and that manufacturers (and
consumers) in those countries focus more on repairing and proper
disposal under Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive
guidelines, currently operating in the European Union.
6. Conclusion
This article has shown how ongoing transitions to low-carbon so-
cieties are being underwritten by serious (but rarely acknowledged)
social and ecological injustices at opposite ends of the supply chain – at
Table 5
Holistic policy recommendations from interview respondents to improve the sustainability of cobalt mining and e-waste processing.
Source: Authors, based on the expert and community research interviews. Note: ASM=artisanal and small scale mining. LSM=industrial and large-scale mining.
OECD = Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development. SAEMAPE = Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement de l’exploitation artisanal à Petit Echelle
Scale Illustrative stakeholders Policy recommendations
DRC Ghana
Supra-regional and
global
European Union, United Nations, OECD, firms in
the global cobalt supply chain, firms making and
exporting electronics equipment
1. Pursue broader and more robust
community benefit sharing agreements
4. Establish better inventories and data repositories
for tracking and monitoring waste flows
2. Recognize the limitations of
traceability schemes and formalization
5. Force e-waste exporters to better sort and separate
waste flows
3. Appreciate the necessity of ASM
cobalt mining for community livelihood
6. Encourage upcycling and the right to repair to
minimize e-waste flows
7. Implement stronger reverse logistics and extended
producer responsibility policies
8. Tackle e-waste as part of an integrated waste
management program (which would also include
plastic waste, organic waste, etc.)
National and regional Government bodies such as the Ministry of Mines
in the DRC, or the Ministry of Trade and Industry,
Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Protection,
Environmental Protection Agency or Ministry of
Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation
in Ghana, municipal authorities such as mining
cooperatives in the DRC, or the Accra
Metropolitan Assembly
9. Enforce better occupational
standards for ASM mines
12. Undertake improved customs screening and
classification of imported waste flows
10. Form joint ventures between ASM
and LSM interests
13. Implement enhanced waste sorting and separation
of wastes streams
11. Implement better dust and tailings
management at LSM mines
14. Increase financing flows and levy more
substantial charges on e-waste
15. Formalize some e-waste activities and build more
recycling centers
16. Complement any such formalization with poverty
reduction programs and a respect for the informal e-
waste sector
Local and community Community groups such as artisanal miners,
mining cooperatives, e-waste workers, residents,
associations such as SAEMAPE in the DRC, or the
Greater Accra Scrap Dealers Association and the
Scrap Dealers Association at Agbogbloshie
17. Support training for alternative
livelihoods and awareness of health
risks
19. Offer targeted medical and health care to
Agbogbloshie residents
18. Implement gender sensitivity and
child protection educational programs
20. Introduce education about e-waste and waste
sorting in schools
21. Facilitate community involvement and ownership
22. Incentivize stakeholder input into data collection
23. Create better training programs for e-waste
sorting and dismantling, as well as gender relations
and child protection
24. Provide protective gear and equipment to e-waste
workers
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the artisanal mines providing cobalt from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), and at the facilities handling streams of electronic
waste in Ghana. Indeed, as our results show, without careful attention
low-carbon transitions may be paradoxically contributing to environ-
mental destruction, air pollution, contamination of water, and the
health risk of cancer and birth defects. They can deepen existing gender
inequalities. They depend on the exploitation of children, some of
whom are exposed to extreme risks of death and injury while mining for
cobalt, drowned in waterlogged pits, or worked to death in the e-waste
scrapyards of Ghana. Low carbon transitions are also worsening the
subjugation and exploitation of ethnic minorities and refugees.
Perversely, in both cases, the dispossessed communities of Congolese
cobalt mining and e-waste processing in Ghana come to rely or depend
on the very activities that are harming them.
One core conclusion is that patterns of injustice and domination are
embedded in existing processes of decarbonisation, in spite of the as-
sumption that low carbon trajectories represent a more just way of
producing energy. While decarbonisation may thus contribute to
cleaner air and cleaner production in the Global North, much of the
environmental and social harm is simply made invisible and displaced,
or spatially externalized, to the Global South. We term this phenom-
enon the “decarbonisation divide,” and that divide is simultaneously
conceptual or epistemic, geographic, environmental, and develop-
mental. Conceptually, it reflects an epistemic divide in that much re-
search in the North focuses on the diffusion and use of decarbonisation
technology and systems, but ignores harmful impacts and the re-
production of inequalities in other parts of the lifecycle (upstream,
downstream) in the South. The term captures a geographic divide in
that those impacts are split literally and unevenly across space by
continents: cleaner technology is deployed in one place (East Asia,
Europe, North America) whereas its manufacturing costs and wastes
occur in another place (Africa and other parts of the developing world).
It reflects an environmental divide, in that the Northern natural en-
vironment gets cleaner while the Southern environment gets dirtier and
even locked into more polluting and at times carbon intensive activities.
The term lastly reflects a relational developmental divide, a process by
which some localities are forced into Faustian pacts with other weal-
thier and powerful countries or firms in order to attract revenue or
investment, but remain comparatively weak in poverty and perpetual
disadvantage. The irony is not only that the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Ghana become “sacrifice zones” (Healy et al., 2019) for low-
carbon development under this divide; but also that they will them-
selves become more difficult to decarbonize in the future as they are
locked into embedded flows of pollution and dependent on the very
processes of dispossession that victimize them.
Secondly, we must resist the temptation to only examine low-carbon
transitions, and the particular innovations underpinning them, at their
point of diffusion, deployment, or use. We need to instead critically
assess the entire lifecycle or “whole system” of these innovations, from
the front end where metals and minerals are extracted, to the back end
where waste streams reside. GER7 even cautioned that:
If we fully achieve Sustainable Development Goal 7, and ramp up re-
newables or universal access to modern energy services, what does that
mean for waste systems? We fully introduce hazardous waste from
batteries, digital devices, and solar panels into societies that are used to
biogenic cycles. In rural communities, these communities dispose of
electronic equipment into latrines. The e-waste dilemma fits into the
material implications of rural electrification and decarbonisation, and it
exposes the Global South to increasingly toxic material flows.
Such a “whole systems” analytical focus would help address the
dissonance that currently exists between the use of low-carbon in-
novations to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in places such as
Europe and North America, and the pernicious and persistent con-
sequences befalling communities in countries such as the DRC and
Ghana.
When put into context of calls for a “just transition” (Heffron and
McCauley 2018), this energy justice focus significantly expands the
scope of what a “just transition” is or should be. A “just transition,”
when guided by more multi-scalar and reflective energy justice ap-
proaches, would consider well beyond the lost coal mining jobs in
Germany or disrupted energy markets in the United States to the formal
and informal labor segments of Africa (and beyond), many of them low-
wage, less organized, and highly at risk. Just transitions research, as
Eicke et al. (2019) put it, must become more globally aware and at-
tempt to minimize transnational unevenness. For perversely, the more
global society currently decarbonizes under this model of a divide, the
more aggravated and vulnerable particular communities become, the
more local health deteriorates, the more women are marginalized, the
more children are enslaved, the more minorities are subjugated.
Thirdly, low-carbon transitions are not just about climate change or
carbon emissions. Given that these transitions are in motion within a
capitalist, materialist, and overly unequal world-system that is struc-
tured by existing inequalities between and within societies, dec-
arbonisation can clearly entrench particular power relations, mirror
and circulate patterns of ethnic or gender prejudice, or exacerbate po-
litical powerlessness and peripheralisation. Even though cobalt mining
and e-waste scrapyards may be necessary parts of the global economy,
the spaces within which decarbonisation operates require complex and
adaptive management, one that must recognize and remediate land-
scapes of toxicity, gender relations, patterns of child labor, and dis-
crimination. The academic community in particular needs to continue
developing more multi-scalar, multi-level understandings of such
transitions and their processes which cut across geographic space
(Europe, North America, and Africa), categories of creation and de-
struction, and chains of value (upstream, midstream, and downstream).
In laying out these concerns, our intent is not to stop all low-carbon
transitions. To the contrary, we take the urgent need for decarbonisa-
tion across the economy including systems of energy provision, mobi-
lity, agriculture, food, waste, water, and forestry as a given (Brown and
Sovacool 2011; Geels et al., 2017). Instead, our aim here is to caution
against complacency in the promotion and analysis of low carbon
transitions. The study demands that we take a whole systems approach
to decarbonisation that fully accounts for the suite of social and en-
vironmental costs that low-carbon transitions bear on some of the
poorest, most vulnerable segments of our global society. It questions the
possibility of decarbonisation and green transitions without structural
changes to the global political economy, trade flows, production and
consumption patterns, and unequal access to resources. In short, true
low-carbon transitions must involve challenging global distribution of
power and become more accountable, equitable and just (Scoones et al.,
2015).
Taking these conclusions seriously thus challenges the very idea of
conceptualizing renewable energies as sustainable, or – given the con-
tinued reliance on the mining of finite metals – even as renewable
(Dunlap 2019; Dunlap and Brock 2020). The policy community in-
centivizing low-carbon pathways, and the engineering community de-
signing low-carbon innovations, must no longer ignore or disengage
from these concerns. Nor should the research community abstain from
the normative and ethical implications of the sustainability transitions
they examine, or rely on analytical constructs or conceptual frame-
works that mask the decarbonization divide . For low-carbon transitions
can be currently considered as fully sustainable only if we use ex-
tremely limited criteria for assessment.
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